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Investment behaviour of EU arable crop 
farms in selected EU countries and the 
impact of policy reforms 
ABSTRACT 
This deliverable provides a comparative analysis, among selected EU member states, of the investment 
demand of a sample of specialised field crop farms for farm buildings, machinery and equipment as 
determined by different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support. It allows for the 
existence of uncertainty in the price of output farmers receive and for both long- and short-run 
determinants of investment levels, as well as for the presence of irregularities in the cost adjustment 
function due to the existence of threshold-type behaviours. The empirical estimation reveals that three 
investment regimes are consistently identified in Germany and Hungary, across asset and support 
types, and in France for machinery and equipment. More traditional disinvestment-investment type 
behaviours characterise investment in farm building in France and the UK, across support types, and 
Italy for both asset classes under coupled payments. The long-run dynamic adjustment of capital 
stocks is consistently and significantly estimated to be towards a – mostly non-stationary – lower level 
of capitalisation of the farm analysed. By contrast, the expected largely positive short-run effects of an 
increase in output prices are often not significant. The effect of CAP support on both types of 
investment is positive, although seldom significant, while the proxy for uncertainty employed fails to 
be significant yet, in most cases, has the expected effect of reducing the investment levels. 
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1. Introduction 
A farmer’s decision to invest in physical capital (i.e., farm buildings, machinery and 
equipment) might be the result of economic considerations regarding the likely difference 
between the purchase and resale price of an asset (Johnson, 1956) as well as the uncertain 
nature of farm output price and government support (i.e., Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
provisions in the European Union (EU)) (Serra et al. 2009; Boetel et al., 2007). The latter 
might either influence relative prices through coupled support and/or increase the 
contribution of non-output related income to total farm income through decoupled subsidies. 
Both types of subsidy might relax existing budget or credit constraints (Sckokai, 2005) 
and/or diminish price/revenue uncertainty, resulting in higher physical investment. 
Nonetheless, the decision to avoid investing may still be optimal if irregularities in the 
adjustment cost function arise. 
Drawing on Serra et al. (2009), the present contribution estimates a reduced form of 
investment demand function for two asset classes allowing for threshold-type behaviours 
compatible with a number of capital market imperfections (i.e., differences between an 
asset’s purchase and resale price (Johnson, 1956); asymmetries in fixed capital adjustment 
costs (Abel and Eberly, 1994); real option (Huttel et al., 2010)) in an attempt to explain the 
frequent occurrence – in farm level data – of zero and negative gross investment levels. It 
does so by carefully implementing the threshold regression model developed by Hansen 
(1996, 1999, 2000) to endogenously and consistently determine and test whether the 
investment model is characterised by multiple, rather than single, equilibria. This would in 
turn highlight the optimal nature of the recorded investment values rather than suggesting 
that realised investment values strictly depend on the presence of imperfections in a number 
of connected markets. Since conditions and constraints are likely to vary significantly across 
the EU, also due to the different implementation of decoupled subsidies between old and new 
member state (MS), a comparative analysis of agricultural investment might be worth 
pursuing. In fact, while the existing literature adopting these theoretical and empirical tools 
has mainly focused on only one geographic region at a time (Boetel et al., 2007; Serra et al., 
2009) this work provides simultaneous evidence of the effect of CAP provisions on the asset 
classes of interest for selected EU MS. Moreover, relying on the long-term time span covered 
by the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) dataset, we are also able to highlight the 
different effects on agricultural investment of coupled and decoupled subsidies, the former 
implemented until the 2005 Fischler reform of the CAP, the latter currently in place in the 
form of the Single Farm Payment (SFP). 
In what follows, the theoretical model is laid out; section 3 details the data management to 
construct the variables of interest while section 4 describes the estimation procedure. Section 
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5 presents the econometric estimates for the two asset classes and types of CAP support of 
interest while the last section provides some concluding remarks. 
2. Theoretical model 
Borrowing from Sckokai and Moro (2009) the problem of a farmer’s decision on the optimal 
quantity of investment to undertake originates from the objective to maximise – over an 
infinite horizon – the farm’s discounted value by solving the problem: 
 
ܬሺ·ሻ ൌ
݉ܽݔ
ܫ ׬ ݁
ି௥௧ݑሺܣ, ߪ஺
ଶሻஶ
଴
ݏ. ݐ. ሶ݇ ൌ ሺܫ െ ߜ݇ሻ
  (1) 
where ݑሺܣ, ߪ஺
ଶሻ is a farmer’s utility function defined on ܣ, the farm’s wealth, and ߪ஺
ଶ, the 
variance of the farm’s wealth. In turn, ܣ may be specified as ܣ ൌ ܣ଴ ൅ ݌ҧݕ െ ݓݔ െ ܿ݇ ൅ ܵ 
where ܣ଴ is a farm’s initial wealth, ݕ is a farm’s aggregate output - deriving from the 
production function ݕ ൌ ݂ሺݔ, ݇, ܫሻ defined over the quantity of an aggregate variable input ݔ, 
the units of capital stock ݇ and the level of gross investment ܫ – priced at price ݌. Assuming 
the market output price ݌ is a random variable, its mean value ݌ҧ affects the farmer’s decision 
through its effect on the value of farm’s assets while the price variance ߪ௣ଶ is the source of 
uncertainty regarding the level of farm’s assets since ߪ஺
ଶ ൌ ݂൫ߪ௣ଶ൯. Moreover, the variable 
input ݔ is priced at its market price ݓ while ܿ is the capital rental price and ݎ is the 
discounting factor which can be well approximated by the interest rate. The specification of 
farm’s wealth ܣ includes the amount of subsidies received by the farm ܵ. Given our interest in 
evaluating and comparing the effects of different types of CAP support (i.e., coupled and 
decoupled payments), the specification of ܵ will vary according to the years for which the data 
are analysed. 
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated to (1) can be stated as: 
 ݎܬ ൌ
݉ܽݔ
ܫ ሼݑ ൅ ܬ௞ሺܫ െ ߜ݇ሻሽ  (2) 
where ܬ௞ is the first derivative of ܬሺ·ሻ with respect to capital (Sckokai and Moro, 2009; Serra 
et al. (2009)). Assuming the existence of an interior solution, the shadow value of capital 
equals the marginal adjustment cost (Sckokai and Moro, 2009). In turn, the first derivative of 
(2) with respect to capital yields the investment demand equation represented in implicit 
form as: 
 ሶ݇ ൫ݎ, ܣ଴, ݌ҧ, ݓ, ܿ, ܵ, ߪ௣ଶ, ݇൯  (3) 
While the capital adjustment cost function arising from (3) is strictly positive and increasing, 
the literature on investment under uncertainty has been increasingly interested in modelling 
more realistic behaviours of investment dynamics. In particular, Abel and Eberly (1994) have 
proposed a theoretical model able to account for differences between the asset’s purchase and 
resale price, asymmetries in the fixed capital adjustment costs and a kinked adjustment costs 
function at the origin. While capital investment remains characterised by a non-decreasing 
relationship of the asset’s shadow price ܬ௞, a threshold-type behaviour emerges. In fact, 
optimal investment is expected to be negative (positive) for a value of ܬ௞ smaller (larger) than 
a lower (upper) threshold level while it is expected to be zero for values of the asset’s shadow 
price between the two thresholds (Serra et al., 2009). 
Applications of the Abel and Eberly (1994) extension of the traditional investment model 
under uncertainty appear to be quite rare in the agricultural economics literature. The first 
contribution could be traced back to Boetel et al. (2007), who investigated the effect of asset 
fixity, investment asymmetry and the possible existence of a sluggish regime in the demand 
for a quasi-fixed input in US hog production. It is interesting to note that Boetel et al. (2007) 
allow the constant and the coefficient for the capital stock at the previous period to vary 
across the three expected regimes while they circumvent the problem of the shadow price of 
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capital being unobservable, assuming there exists a mapping function into farm output 
prices. Moreover, Boetel et al. (2007) are the first to employ the methodology suggested by 
Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000) to estimate an investment function exhibiting a threshold-type 
behaviour. Huttel et al. (2010) rely on the model in Abel and Eberly (1994) to account for 
additional costs relating to the financial structure of the farm, due to the existence of 
imperfections in the capital markets, and their possibility of yielding zero investment rates. 
The latter constitute an optimal reaction to the existence of investment irreversibility and 
uncertainty about future prospects. Serra et al. (2009) extend the contribution in Boetel et al. 
(2007) allowing for both the capital stock and output price variable to determine regime-
specific speeds of adjustment to a long and short run capital endowment, respectively. Serra 
et al. (2009) are interested in studying the impact of a decoupled-type transfer on investment 
decisions of a sample of Kansas farms. Since output prices determine a short-run adjustment 
in investment levels, Serra et al. (2009) assume the existence of a function mapping the 
unobservable shadow price of capital ܬ௞ into the lagged value of per hectare net farm income. 
Although the specification of the structural value function ܬሺ·ሻ would allow us to obtain the 
final form of the model in (3), Serra et al. (2009) avoid the many difficulties associated to its 
estimation subject to threshold effects by specifying its reduced-form counterpart as: 
 ሶ݇ ൌ ߚଵ
′ݔܫ൫ܬ௞ ൑ ܬ௞
௟ ൯ ൅ ߚଶ
′ݔܫ൫ܬ௞
௟ ൏ ܬ௞ ൑ ܬ௞
௨൯ ൅ ߚଷ
′ݔܫሺܬ௞
௨ ൏ ܬ௞ሻ  (4) 
where the ߚݏ are the vectors of parameters’ estimates, the one for the exogenous explanatory 
variables is defined as ݔ ൌ ൫ݎ, ܣ଴, ݌ҧ, ݓ, ܿ, ܵ, ߪ௣ଶ, ݇൯, with all the variables in parentheses defined 
as above, and ܫሺ·ሻ is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if the condition in parentheses 
is met. 
3. Data 
This paper estimates the investment model, subject to threshold effects, on a sample of 
specialised arable crop farms drawn from those subject, every year, to the survey each MS 
carries out – on behalf of the European Commission (EC) – as part of the FADN initiative 
intended to collect relevant economic information from agricultural holdings in the EU. 
Specialised field crop farms are those classified, according to their main output, as “specialist 
cereals, oilseeds and protein crops (COP)”, “general field cropping” and “mixed cropping” 
(TF8=13 or TF8=14 or TF8=60). Although this paper aimed to provide a consistent 
evaluation of the impact of CAP subsidies on the level of investment in France (FR), Germany 
(DE), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Poland (PO), the Netherlands (NL) and the 
United Kingdom (UK), we were unable to obtain a sample size for IE and the NL allowing for 
profitable estimation, given the very limited number of farms in the specialisation of our 
interest. Moreover, we failed to secure a long enough time-series for the cost of buildings in 
PO which prevented us from calculating an appropriate rental price of capital. Therefore, the 
present analysis investigates investment behaviours for FR, DE, HU, IT and the UK only. 
Since the empirical model employed (Hansen, 1999) has been developed only for balanced 
panel data sets and, with the exception of the new member states (NMS), the coupled and 
decoupled CAP subsidy regimes have been in place before and after 2005, respectively. Due 
to the heavily imbalanced nature of the FADN panel dataset, we have been forced to 
construct two 4-year datasets (2001-2004 and 2005-2008) for every country of interest.1 A 
four-year time span appears sufficient to justify the adoption of the methodology while 
ensuring a reasonable operating sample size. Throughout the procedure developed to prepare 
the dataset for estimation, consistency and quality checks on the FADN data are carried out. 
To begin with, we delete observations that report zero total Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA), 
namely SE025=0. 
                                                        
1 The UK is an exception to this rule since, for this country, the year 2001 appears problematic, providing 
very few observations. Therefore, for the UK we construct the 1997-2000 and 2005-2008 datasets. 
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Following Serra et al. (2009), we allow investment levels to adjust – in a regime-dependent 
manner – due to short-run variations in a synthetic measure of the farm’s output price. Since 
specialised field crop farms are multi-output enterprises both in crop production and in other 
complementary outputs (i.e., livestock and milk production), a synthetic output price index is 
constructed out of the data available in the FADN. 
First of all, total output value – for the productions listed in Table 1 – is defined as the sum of 
sales (suffix SA to the K### product of interest), farmhouse consumption (suffix FC to the 
K### product of interest) and farm use (suffix FU to the K### product of interest). Since the 
FADN dataset provides information on the related amount of output quantity (suffix QQ to 
the K### product of interest), unit-value prices are calculated dividing the total output value 
previously constructed by the relevant K###QQ. The ensuing unit values suffer from two 
major problems: very small (and large) minimum (and maximum) values and a high 
incidence of missing values due to the division by zero K###QQ.2 The first issue is tackled 
trimming each yearly price series at the bottom and top 5% to exclude outliers. The second 
issue has been tackled replacing, for every year, missing or zero prices with their respective 
averages at two different geographical levels. We exploit the FADN’s representativeness at 
the division level (A1) and perform the substitution employing average prices calculated at 
the A1 level.3 In case instances of zero and/or missing prices persisted after this first round of 
substitutions, they have been replaced with national yearly averages. We have built the list of 
outputs to be aggregated into a more complex index working on the FADN data for IT, since 
it is the country we know more about and for which arable crop farms should have a large 
output variety. Later on, we have adapted it for other countries, removing from the output set 
those that did not achieve a complete price time series after the two substitutions described 
above. Table 1 summarises the output prices considered for every country of interest. The 
rationale for this procedure is to ensure that we can aggregate the largest amount of price 
information in a single output price and exploit the longest time series available in further 
elaborations. 
Table 1. Composition of the single-output farm price, by country 
Output Heading in FADN’s Table K FR DE HU IT UK 
Common wheat and spelt 120 √ √ √ √ √ 
Durum wheat 121 √  √ √  
Barley 123 √ √ √ √ √ 
Oats 124 √ √ √ √ √ 
Grain maize 126 √ √ √ √  
Other cereals 128 √  √ √  
Potatoes 130 √ √ √ √ √ 
Sugar beets 131 √ √ √ √ √ 
Permanent pasture 150   √ √  
Rough grazing 151   √ √  
Cow’s milk 162 √ √ √ √  
Wool 166 √  √ √ √ 
Sunflower 332 √ √ √ √  
Soya 333 √  √ √  
Source: Own elaboration on EU-FADN - DG AGRI data for the relevant countries. 
                                                        
2 This occurs since sales might originate from the stocks of products carried over from the previous 
accounting year rather than out of current year production. 
3 The exclusion of IE and the NL from the set of countries for which the model can be estimated is further 
justified by the impossibility of performing this procedure while preserving significant price variability. In 
fact, for these two countries the A1 geographical level corresponds to the whole country. 
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Second, the newly filled-out and trimmed series of unit-value prices are multiplied by the 
respective output quantities (K###QQ) to re-construct output values and circumvent the 
problem of inconsistent reporting of output values and quantities. In fact, once the re-
constructed output values have been added up, across outputs, observations with zero total 
output are dropped.4 
The next step builds the share of the newly re-calculated total output value for the single 
output of interest to the farm’s total newly re-calculated output value across the outputs 
considered. The latter constitute the weights employed to construct the weighted average 
synthetic price of farm output. Once the average farm output price is calculated, it is turned 
into a price index divided by the variable’s value for the first farm in the sample for the base 
year.5 
The price index is employed to derive farm-level expected output price index (expoutpi) and 
its variance (varoutpi) drawing on Chavas and Holt (1990). The series of the price index is 
collapsed at the regional (A1) level, for every year in the sample. To minimise the loss of 
useful information, we recode the missing regional identifiers (A1) to the closest 
neighbouring one. We adapt the original Chavas and Holt (1990) methodology to allow for 
only partially adaptive expectations. In fact, the expectation of the prediction error is 
obtained averaging the prediction errors for the preceding five years. Due to data limitations 
in HU, we restrict this informative base to only three years and do not calculate the varoutpi 
since, otherwise, we would be left with only a two-years sample. 
The model’s explanatory variables include an aggregate measure of the farm’s input prices 
calculated employing a procedure similar to the one outlined for obtaining the output price 
index. The basic information employed in the procedure is drawn from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network’s (FADN) Table F, collecting the farm’s expenditure for different 
inputs, and the EUROSTAT input price indexes. In fact, the former does not provide any 
useful information to calculate input unit-value prices, as suggested above. To improve on the 
consistency of the estimating dataset, base 2000 indexes (code apri_pi00_ina) have been 
used as a reference for extracting the price indexes to be associated to the relevant FADN 
information, as presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that seeds, seedlings and food stuff are assumed to have the same price, 
irrespective of whether they are purchased or produced on the farm. The procedure to obtain 
a synthetic price for the farm’s input requires calculating the share of each of the farm’s cost 
expenditure items, aggregated out of FADN’s Table F, to total farm input expenditure and 
using them to weigh the relevant EUROSTAT price index. Note that the occurrence of 
negative shares leads to the associated farm dropping out of the sample. The ensuing values 
divided by the one obtained for the reference farm, already identified upon calculating the 
output price index, yield the series of the aggregate price index (inppi). 
  
                                                        
4 This procedure implies that more importance is attributed to the reporting of output quantities (K###QQ) 
than the ‘original’ output value(s) (for instance, K###SA). 
5 The first farm in the sample is selected to ensure that a long-time series of price indexes is obtained while 
the same farm is still in the sample at a later stage of the dataset manipulation. In turn, the base year for the 
output price index in FR is 1999, in DE is 2000, in HU is 2004, in IT and in the UK is 1996. 
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Table 2. EUROSTAT input price indices and related FADN input expenditure headings 
EUROSTAT price index for EUROSTAT 
code 
FADN heading(s) FADN code(s) 
Seeds and planting stock 201000 
Seeds and seedlings 
purchased 
Seeds and seedlings farm 
produced 
F72+F73 
Energy, lubricants 202000 
Motor fuels and lubricants 
Electricity 
Heating fuels 
F62+F79+F80 
Fertilisers and soil improvers 203000 Fertilisers and soil improvers F74 
Plant protection products and 
pesticides 
204000 Crop protection products F75 
Veterinary expenses 205000 Other specific livestock costs F71 
Animal food stuff 206000 
Purchased food stuff 
Food stuff produced on the 
farm 
F64+F65+F66+
F67 
F68+F69+F70 
Maintenance of buildings 208000  G98BV 
Other goods and services 209000 
Water 
Insurance 
Other farming overheads 
F81+F82+F84 
Machinery and other equipment 211100  G101BV 
Buildings 212000  G98BV 
Source: Own elaboration on EUROSTAT and EU-FADN - DG AGRI data. 
Due to the focus of this paper, we pay particular attention to the determination of the 
‘quantity’ of capital net investment (inv) and stock (K-1) pertaining to each farm in the 
sample.6 To do so we shall focus on the FADN’s Table G, which collects information on farm 
assets. In this paper we differentiate between the farm net investment and stock ownership of 
farm buildings (FB) (Heading G98) and machinery and equipment (ME) (Heading G101). 
The FADN records information for these headings, differentiating between Opening (i.e., 
beginning of the year) Valuation (suffix BV), Investment before subsidies (suffix IG), 
Subsidies on Investment (suffix SU), Sales (suffix SA), Depreciation (suffix DP) and Closing 
(i.e., end of the year) Valuation (suffix CV). The subsidies that might shape a farm’s 
investment in the capital items of interest are the direct payments (DPs) related to Measure 
Article 20(b)(i) Measure Article 26 “Modernisation of agricultural holdings”.7 Since these 
subsidies are disbursed conditional on the investment being carried out (i.e., a sort of rebate 
on investment costs), we model this receipt as a reduction in the cost of capital. 
First of all, we calculate a unique measure for the farm net value of investment (uninv) in the 
relevant asset subtracting DP and SA from IG in FADN’s Table G (i.e., G###IG- G###SA- 
G###DP). Upon calculating the depreciation rate as the ratio of G###DP to G###BV, we 
drop any observation featuring higher values of the former compared to the latter since, 
otherwise, depreciation rates larger than one would occur. Missing values originating from 
the ratio of zero DP to zero BV of each capital item are recoded to zero for economic 
consistency and to avoid further reductions in sample size. Since the value of DP does not 
appear – at least in IT – to be recorded reflecting standard accounting practices and displays 
quite extreme values, we attribute to each farm the sample’s median value of the calculated 
depreciation rates in any given year for which we have data (meddepr). The share of 
investment subsidies (shinvsub), out of the value of gross investment, is calculated dividing 
                                                        
6 The reader should be able to verify that this ‘quantity’ of capital is, in fact, the real value of capital items. 
7 We thank Prof. Ewa Rabinowics for pointing this out to us. 
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G###SU by G###IG and is cleaned up from unrealistic values (i.e., greater than or equal to 
0.9) and is recoded to zero in case the farm has not reported any IG and, hence, was not 
entitled to any SU. The rental price of the concerned type of capital (rprc) is calculated as: 
 ݎ݌ݎܿ ൌ ሾ݌݅ כ ሺ1 െ ݏ݄݅݊ݒݏݑܾሻሿ כ ቀ௥௜௥௔௧௘
ଵ଴଴
൅ ݉݁݀݀݁݌ݎቁ  (5) 
where rirate is a measure of the national real interest rate, typically calculated as the 
difference between the yield of a government bond of a reasonable length and a measure of 
the nation’s inflation rate (growth rate of a consumer price index). Table 3 collects country-
specific proxies for both variables. 
Table 3. Variables' proxies employed in the calculation of the national rental prices of 
capital 
Country Interest rate proxy Inflation rate proxy 
FR 10 years benchmark rate on loans to non-
financial corporations 
Year-on-year change in the harmonised 
consumer price index 
DE Yields on debt securities outstanding 
issued by residents, public debt securities 
Year-on-year change of the consumer 
price index, seasonally adjusted 
HU Yearly average of the monthly average 
agreed interest rate on loans to non-
financial corporations weighted by the 
amount of outstandings 
Year-on-year change of the yearly 
average consumer price index 
IT Average gross yield of long-term public 
debt securities (BTP) listed on the Italian 
Stock Exchange 
Year-on-year change of the yearly 
average of the general consumer price 
index for the whole community 
UK Annual average of four UK banks’ base 
rates 
Year-on-year change of the consumer 
price index 
Source: authors’ elaboration on national Central Banks and Statistical offices information. 
Note that pi, the EUROSTAT price index for the cost of FB is the simple average of the one 
for maintenance of buildings and buildings from Table 2. Once the rprc has been calculated, 
the ‘lagged’ stock of capital (K-1) is obtained as the ratio of G###BV to the relevant rprc.8 
Similarly, the inv in the relevant asset class is obtained as the ratio of uniinv to its rprc. The 
rprc of every asset class we are interested in is employed to standardise the value of the 
expoutpi, inpi, coupled and decoupled subsidies, farm wealth and lagged income employed in 
the empirical models for the investment in FB and ME. The square of the relevant rprc is 
employed to standardise the varoutpi in each model. 
Following Serra et al. (2009) we model investment demand to depend upon a measure of 
lagged wealth in thousands of euros (wealth) and per hectare income (income).9 The former 
is a measure of total assets (G103), excluding FB and ME, minus total debt (H106). This value 
is obtained relying on BVs to avoid additional reductions in sample size. Income is defined as 
the difference between the value of total output (SE131), the re-calculated expenditure on 
inputs and the reported value of the depreciation on the concerned assets (G98DP and 
G101DP). The latter is turned into its per hectare counterpart by dividing by the total UAA 
(SE025) and then the resulting series is lagged one year. The amount of subsidies the farm 
receives, in thousands of euros, is the sum of total subsidies on crops (SE610) and on 
livestock (SE615) for coupled support (coupsub) and decoupled payments (SE630) for 
decoupled support (decsub). 
                                                        
8 We exploit the availability of both the beginning and end-of-year values of capital and use the former to 
provide the basis for obtaining K-1. While we are aware that this is not a truly ‘lagged’ value, this helps to 
preserve sample size in the very unbalanced FADN dataset. 
9 We thank Laure Latruffe and Laurent Piet for the suggestion of accounting for farm size standardising the 
amount of farm income by total UAA (SE025). 
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The mean and standard deviations for the variables employed to estimate the models for the 
investment demands for FB and ME are presented in Table 4 and 5, respectively. 
Table 4. Summary statistics for the model of investment demand for FB 
 2001–2004¥ 2005-2008 
Variable FR DE IT UK† FR DE HU IT UK 
inv -16.09 
(958.93) 
8.31 
(4435.26) 
-279.74 
(366.82) 
-96.81 
(1064.73) 
-80.28 
(1030.59) 
411.67 
(6074.28) 
437.34 
(6981.55) 
-97.20 
(5339.84) 
40.04 
(1444.48) 
income 17.74 
(30.572) 
66.67 
(77.15) 
177.17 
(277.97) 
18.80 
(25.33) 
29.39 
(52.64) 
79.75 
(102.64) 
37.95 
(70.52) 
144.38 
(333.20) 
21.140 
(29.71) 
K-1 1389.75 
(2839) 
9105.00 
(18785) 
6788.76 
(9524) 
2054.94 
(3498) 
1817.75 
(5578) 
7410.71 
(14074) 
6850.77 
(23760) 
9335.36 
(33574) 
1749.01 
(2912) 
expoutpi 0.0732 
(0.0503) 
0.111 
(0.016) 
0.1313 
(0.0166) 
0.0330 
(0.0068) 
0.0895 
(0.0370) 
0.1353 
(0.0524) 
0.1773 
(0.0778) 
0.1473 
(0.0457) 
0.0415 
(0.0103) 
inpi 6.1010 
(3.6121) 
11.980 
(0.655) 
13.9636 
(0.9531) 
4.5212 
(0.5080) 
6.7500 
(2.3755) 
13.7662 
(2.5000) 
12.9972 
(3.5125) 
14.9314 
(1.7147) 
5.9491 
(1.2712) 
varoutpi 0.9940 
(22.7930) 
1.088 
(1.140) 
1.2620 
(0.7010) 
0.1990 
(0.2730) 
2.0060 
(2.9160) 
5.3100 
(6.3160) 
§ 
7.7200 
(12.9920) 
0.5140 
(0.3500) 
coupsub 2.6655 
(2.4225) 
7.424 
(12.550) 
3.1291 
(5.6061) 
3.3945 
(2.9097) 
§ § 
1.2947 
(3.1297) 
§ § 
decsub 
§ § § § 
1.6938 
(2.4008) 
6.0378 
(8.6204) 
2.6892 
(5.1027) 
2.7190 
(7.7950) 
2.9112 
(2.4886) 
wealth 3.0135 
(9.0275) 
71.990 
(93.502) 
80.1332 
(164.1416) 
58.3491 
(61.2950) 
3.8531 
(9.2979) 
84.2990 
(95.8574) 
9.9175 
(30.0271) 
122.0474 
(326.4338) 
62.1945 
(70.9741) 
n 1636 1180 280 404 1400 1212 828 2280 384 
Notes: inv, income, ܭିଵ, coupsub, decsub and wealth are measured in constant Euros, inppi, expoutpi and varoutpi are 
index numbers, the summary statistics for the series inppi and varoutpi are presented multiplied by 100 and 
10,000, respectively, to avoid computational issues when estimating the model in Matlab;; § denotes Not 
Applicable; ¥ the countries analysed over the period 2001-2004 do not include HU since, back then, it was not 
part of the EU; † the UK sample to analyse the role of coupsub covers the period 1997-2000. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on manipulated EU-FADN - DG AGRI data. 
Table 5. Summary statistics for the model of investment demand for ME 
 2001–2004¥ 2005-2008 
Variable FR DE IT UK† FR DE HU IT UK 
inv -164.06 
(1240.19) 
-259.73 
(1304.44) 
-361.37 
(893.26) 
-394.90 
(1548.50) 
-44.79 
(1157.67) 
17.77 
(1487.67) 
-42.56 
(1782.96) 
-358.04 
(873.16) 
236.52 
(1661.81) 
income 10.2005 
(18.6680) 
20.6730 
(23.9800) 
76.3971 
(119.9770) 
16.5257 
(23.1052) 
15.2264 
(27.7006) 
25.3539 
(32.7532) 
10.9587 
(19.9063) 
58.7533 
(135.2087) 
19.4698 
(27.5666) 
K-1 3162.74 
(3486.74) 
4403.044 
(4550.81) 
3295.404 
(3075.22) 
7493.17 
(6459.61) 
2953.22 
(3000.45) 
4265.42 
(5069.59) 
3598.49 
(6100.80) 
3642.09 
(5151.64) 
7417.64 
(9291.71) 
expoutpi 0.0418 
(0.0233) 
0.0344 
(0.0046) 
0.0567 
(0.0086) 
0.0288 
(0.0041) 
0.0464 
(0.0118) 
0.0429 
(0.0161) 
0.0507 
(0.0168) 
0.0601 
(0.0175) 
0.0383 
(0.0076) 
inpi 3.5119 
(2.5031) 
3.7124 
(0.1226) 
6.0274 
(0.6568) 
3.9783 
(0.1959) 
3.5236 
(0.2615) 
4.3613 
(0.6768) 
3.8056 
(0.4905) 
6.0989 
(0.5111) 
5.4913 
(0.8767) 
varoutpi 0.2050 
(2.1320) 
0.1050 
(0.1110) 
0.2370 
(0.1360) 
0.1440 
(0.1840) 
0.4880 
(0.4640) 
0.5350 
(0.6290) 
§ 
1.2380 
(2.0220) 
0.4340 
(0.2770) 
coupsub 1.5336 
(1.6030) 
2.2969 
(3.8759) 
1.3665 
(2.5443) 
2.9874 
(2.5275) 
§ § 
0.3923 
(0.9500) 
§ § 
decsub 
§ § § § 
0.8538 
(0.8176) 
1.8932 
(2.5908) 
0.7898 
(1.4555) 
1.1143 
(3.2463) 
2.7054 
(2.2978) 
wealth 1.6221 
(4.7398) 
22.3253 
(28.9849) 
34.9133 
(72.5745) 
51.5233 
(53.8386) 
2.0072 
(4.8646) 
26.7501 
(30.3583) 
2.8917 
(9.0746) 
50.0360 
(133.8025) 
57.6573 
(65.2601) 
n 1636 1180 280 404 1400 1212 828 2280 384 
Notes: inv, income, ܭିଵ, coupsub, decsub and wealth are measured in constant Euros, inppi, expoutpi and varoutpi are 
index numbers, the summary statistics for the series inppi and varoutpi are presented multiplied by 100 and 
10,000, respectively, to avoid computational issues when estimating the model in Matlab;; § denotes Not 
Applicable; ¥ the countries analysed over the period 2001-2004 do not include HU since, back then, it was not 
part of the EU; † the UK sample to analyse the role of coupsub covers the period 1997-2000. 
Source: authors’ calculations based on manipulated EU-FADN - DG AGRI data. 
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4. The empirical model 
Following Serra et al. (2009), empirical estimation is based on the threshold regression 
framework proposed, in three seminal papers, by Hansen (1996, 1999, 2000), which develop 
the statistical and asymptotic distribution theory and clarify the procedure to implement the 
model on a balanced panel dataset. According to Hansen (2000), threshold models can be 
employed to estimate models of separating and multiple equilibria, to investigate the 
opportunity to empirically split the estimating sample on the basis of continuous variables 
and to parsimoniously estimate functions in a non-parametric fashion. Moreover, the same 
framework can accommodate, as special cases, more complex models such as mixture, 
switching, Markov switching and smooth transition models. Due to the possibility of different 
behaviours, both in the short and long run, of capital investment, this methodology appears 
particularly suited to test the existence of different investment regimes in the countries of our 
interest. 
Since the methodology does not exist for unbalanced panel data, we rely on the balanced 
panel formulation in Hansen (1999). The structural equation for the farm’s demand for the 
relevant type of investment (y), in the presence of two regimes, can be represented as: 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ߚଵ
ᇱݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛሻ ൅ ߚଶ
ᇱ ݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛሻ ൅ ݁௜௧  (6) 
where the indexes i and t represent farm and time, respectively, xit is the vector of the model’s 
non time-invariant covariates and β’ the related regime-dependent coefficients’ vector, μi is a 
farm-specific effect and eit an independent identically distributed (iid) error term with zero 
mean and finite variance σ2. The model’s coefficients are regime-dependent because of the 
indicator function I(·) being one if the threshold variable qit is smaller than or equal to its 
threshold value γ, and zero otherwise. The equality between the slopes β1’ and β2’ is a testable 
proposition which, if violated, supports the existence of a significant threshold effect 
identifying two regimes and, in turn, two different investment behaviours. Note that, as in 
Hansen (1999) and Serra et al. (2009), some of the coefficients in the β’ vector might be 
restricted to be equal across the regimes such that the role of the related covariates xit is 
regime-independent. In the present application, the only regime-dependent variables are K-1 
and expoutpi expressing the pattern of long and short-run adjustment of capital quantities, 
respectively. Moreover, and contrary to Serra et al. (2009), we follow Hansen (1999) and 
allow the threshold variable qit – in our case income – to be included in the vector of model’s 
covariates. 
If a threshold, hence two regimes, existed (i.e., the model in (6) has a higher explanatory 
power than a simple ‘pooled’ or zero-threshold model), multiple thresholds may exist, leading 
to the identification of more than two regimes/behaviours/equilibria. The empirical 
identification of the ‘real’ number of thresholds appears to be a matter of iteratively 
estimating and testing for the presence of one more threshold than in the previous iteration 
of the model. Nonetheless, we restrict the maximum number of allowed thresholds to two 
such that we can associate to this empirical evidence the existence of, respectively, the 
disinvestment (Dis), zero-investment (ZInv) and investment (Inv) farm behaviour. Therefore, 
the double-threshold model can be written as: 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅ ߚଵ
ᇱݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛଵሻ ൅ ߚଶ
ᇱ ݔ௜௧ܫሺߛଵ ൏ ݍ௜௧ ൑ ߛଶሻ ൅ ߚଷ
ᇱ ݔ௜௧ܫሺݍ௜௧ ൐ ߛଶሻ ൅ ݁௜௧  (7) 
with γ1< γ2. The following sub-section summarises the estimation and testing procedures for 
the single-threshold model (6) first and then extends them, where necessary, to the double-
threshold one in (7). 
4.1 Estimation and testing 
Hansen (1999) suggests removing the farm-specific effect μi in (6) taking the difference 
between each variable in the specification and its respective average over the time index t 
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(i.e., de-meaning with unit specific time means). The resulting variables will be denoted by 
the superscript *: 
 ݕ௜௧
כ ൌ ߚଵ
ᇱݔ௜௧
כ ܫሺݍ௜௧
כ ൑ ߛሻ ൅ ߚଶ
ᇱ ݔ௜௧
כ ܫሺݍ௜௧
כ ൐ ߛሻ ൅ ݁௜௧
כ   (8) 
The formulation in (8) can be compacted rewriting xit and β as: 
ݔ௜௧
כ ሺߛሻ ൌ ൬
ݔ௜௧
כ ܫሺݍ௜௧
כ ൑ ߛሻ
ݔ௜௧
כ ܫሺݍ௜௧
כ ൐ ߛሻ
൰ 
ߚ ൌ ൬
ߚଵ
ߚଶ
൰ 
such that (8) reads as: 
 ݕ௜௧
כ ൌ ߚᇱݔ௜௧
כ ሺߛሻ ൅ ݁௜௧
כ   (9) 
Stacking the observations for individual i over t=2,…T and then over all individuals, the 
notation can be simplified to obtain: 
 ܻכ ൌ ܺכሺߛሻߚ ൅ ݁כ  (10) 
If γ were known, the vector of slope coefficients β could be estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) as: 
 ߚመሺߛሻ ൌ ൫ܺכሺߛሻᇱܺכሺߛሻ൯
ିଵ
ܺכሺߛሻᇱܻכ  (11) 
but, since it is unknown, it needs estimating before moving on to determine ߚመ . Hansen 
(2000) recommends estimating γ by least squares (LS) minimising the concentrated sum of 
squared errors S1(γ) from (11): 
 ߛො ൌ ܽݎ݃݉݅݊ ଵܵሺߛሻ  (12) 
where ଵܵሺߛሻ ൌ ݁כ෡ ሺߛሻᇱ݁כ෡ ሺߛሻ and the vector of regression residuals ݁כ෡ ሺߛሻ is obtained from (10) 
or, equivalently and more conveniently,  ଵܵሺߛሻ ൌ ܻכ
ᇱ ቀܫ െ ܺכሺߛሻᇱ൫ܺכሺߛሻᇱܺכሺߛሻ൯
ିଵ
ܺכሺߛሻᇱቁ ܻכ. 
Hansen (1999) remarks that it is undesirable for the optimal threshold value ߛො to separate too 
few observations in the two regimes, while Hansen (2000) notes that a monotonic 
transformation on the threshold parameter would render it unit free and constrain it in the 
[0,1] interval. Nonetheless, the pointwise test statistics appear to be very sensitive to extreme 
values of the transformed threshold. To overcome both problems, borrowing from the 
changepoint literature,10 Hansen (2000) seems to endorse Andrews (1993) suggestion to 
restrict the range of the transformed threshold parameter to [0.15, 0.85]. This is achieved 
eliminating the smallest and largest 15% of the values of the distinct (unique) values assumed 
by the threshold variable qit. This appears to be a well-established choice of the trimming 
parameter (Hansen (1999), Dang et al. (2012)) we comply with. The search for ߛො would entail 
the calculation of S1(γ) for every unique value of the threshold variable qit, after the trimming 
percentage has been applied. To avoid the ensuing computational burden, especially when 
dealing with very large datasets, Hansen (1999) suggests obtaining equivalent results 
implementing a grid search over specific quantiles (400 in total) of the distribution of qit. 
Once the value of the threshold has been estimated, it is necessary to determine whether its 
effect is statistically significant, i.e., whether the sets of coefficients’ estimates are different 
across regimes. Therefore, the following test for the significance of one threshold can be 
designed: 
 ൜
ܪ଴: ߚଵ ൌ ߚଶ
ܪ௔: ߚଵ ് ߚଶ
  (13) 
                                                        
10 It should be noted that the threshold regression literature builds on the findings and results obtained by 
the changepoint literature. 
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The likelihood ratio statistic to evaluate the hypotheses (13), LR1 is: 
 ܮܴଵ ൌ
ௌబି ௌభሺఊෝሻ
ఙෝమ
  (14) 
where S0 is the concentrated sum of squared errors associated to the zero threshold model 
(i.e., pooled OLS),  ଵܵሺߛොሻ is the model’s concentrated sum of squared errors at the estimated 
threshold value ߛො and ߪොଶ ൌ ଵ
௡ሺ்ିଵሻ
 ଵܵሺߛොሻ, with n and T being the number of observations per 
time period and the number of time periods, respectively. The testing procedure in (13) is 
complicated by the evidence that, under H0, the threshold γ is not identified; the asymptotic 
distribution of LR1 is non-standard, strictly dominates the ߯௞
ଶ one, but depends on the sample 
moments, such that it cannot be tabulated. Hansen (1996) proves that a bootstrap procedure 
obtains a first-order approximation of the asymptotic distribution of LR1 such that the p-
values constructed from the bootstrap itself are asymptotically valid. Hansen (1999) is the 
reference for a recommended implementation of this bootstrap procedure. Once the 
bootstrap procedure has been written, the researcher is left with choosing the number of 
repetitions to carry out. Andrews and Buchinsky (2001; 2002) provide Monte Carlo 
simulations for a three-step procedure to select the ‘optimal’ number of bootstrap repetitions 
to obtain a statistic of interest (i.e., standard error, confidence intervals, tests and p-values) – 
bootstrapped from a finite number of repetitions – which is close to the ideal one that would 
be obtained running an infinite number of repetitions. Drawing on this applied and 
simulation work and given our interest in both bootstrapped confidence intervals and p-
values, we decided to run 5,000 repetitions.11 
Having verified that the estimated threshold has significant effects, ߛො is a consistent estimate 
of the threshold’s (γ) true, and unknown, value ߛ଴ (Hansen, 2000). Nonetheless, a test for the 
precision of such an estimate can be specified as: 
 ൜
ܪ଴: ߛ ൌ ߛ଴
ܪ௔: ߛ ് ߛ଴
  (15) 
Hansen (2000) suggests carrying out the test forming a ‘no-rejection region’ for the LR2 
defined as: 
 ܮܴଶሺߛሻ ൌ
ௌభሺఊሻିௌభሺఊෝሻ
ఙෝమ
  (16) 
where the terms are as previously defined. The LR2 statistic evaluates whether the true value 
of γ is indeed at ߛො or in its neighbourhood such that a confidence interval for the threshold’s 
estimate, at a specified confidence level, is constructed.12 The size of this confidence interval 
complements the significance of the threshold’s effect in suggesting the ‘strength’ of 
separation between the identified regimes. The LR2 statistic converges, in distribution, to a 
value ξ (i.e., a random variable) with non-standard – yet free of nuisance parameters – 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) ܲሺߦ ൑ ݔሻ ൌ ൬1 െ ݁ݔ݌ ቀെ ௫
ଶ
ቁ൰
ଶ
. Since this CDF is 
pivotal it can be used to form valid asymptotic confidence intervals, based on – for every 
confidence level α – the associated critical values: ܿሺߙሻ ൌ െ2݈݋݃൫1 െ √1 െ ߙ൯. The H0 in (11) 
is rejected, at the asymptotic level α, if ܮܴଶሺߛሻ exceeds ܿሺߙሻ. Since the asymptotic confidence 
interval for γ corresponds to the ‘no-rejection region’ of confidence level 1-α (i.e., the values 
                                                        
11 Andrews and Buchinsky (2001) express the disconcerting finding that the number of bootstrap repetitions 
carried out in most econometric applications is much smaller than the one required to achieve a sufficiently 
accurate simulated statistic of interest. Most likely due to a large dataset employed and more limited 
computing power than available today Hansen (1999) in his Matlab code, which we modify to suit our 
needs, selects 300 repetitions for his bootstraps, which might be deemed small by Andrews and Buchinsky 
(2001; 2002) standards. 
12 Hansen (1999), in his Matlab code, employs a 95% confidence interval, which we also adopt in our 
application. 
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of γ such that ܮܴଶሺߛሻ ൑ ܿሺߙሻ), Hansen (1999) suggests identifying them by plotting the values 
of ܮܴଶሺߛሻ against γ and a flat line drawn at ܿሺߙሻ. Note that Hansen (2000) remarks that the 
construction of the threshold’s confidence interval rests on the assumption that e* is 
homoschedastic, or at least that conditional heteroschedasticity is not regime dependent 
(Hansen, 1997).13 Otherwise, the critical values ܿሺߙሻ need to be corrected by multiplying for 
an estimable – although with some difficulties – parameter. 
The estimates of β, according to (11), appear to depend on the threshold’s estimate ߛො. Yet, 
Hansen (2000) demonstrates that this link is not of first-order asymptotic importance, 
resulting in ߚመ  being asymptotically normal with an estimable – and possibly heteroschedastic 
– covariance matrix. Hansen (1999) suggests that large differences between conventional and 
heteroschedasticity robust OLS standard errors provide evidence in favour of a correction. 
Nonetheless, we believe a more formal test for the heteroschedastic behaviour of the OLS 
remainder error term should be run and the ensuing evidence should determine the nature of 
the presented standard errors. Contrary to much of the extant literature which adheres to 
Hansen’s (1999) ‘qualitative’ recommendation, of which Savvides and Stengos (2000) 
constitute an exception, before presenting the model’s estimates we run a version of the 
White (1980) test for heteroschedasticity of the remainder error. The test entails an ancillary 
regression of the squares of the OLS residuals on the squares of the explanatory variables. In 
case the null hypothesis of homoschedasticity is rejected, heteroschedasticity robust standard 
errors are obtained, and presented, employing the Eicker (1967)-Huber (1967)-White (1980) 
estimator. 
Hansen (1999) posits that the procedure to estimate the single threshold model in (6) can be 
employed also to estimate the double (and higher order) threshold model in (7). This is due 
to the (multiple) changepoint literature’s result that the sequential estimation of a single 
threshold model yields consistent estimates for the multiple threshold one. In the first stage, 
a single threshold model is estimated yielding the ensuing sum of squared errors  ଵܵሺߛሻ, 
which is minimum at ߛଵෝ . This estimate is consistent also in the case of the double threshold 
model in (7) for either ߛଵ or ߛଶ, depending on which effect is stronger. Fixing the first 
threshold’s estimate ߛଵෝ , the second threshold’s estimate is: 
 ߛଶ
௥෢ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉݅݊ ܵଶ
௥ሺߛଶሻ  (17) 
where 
 ܵଶ
௥ሺߛଶሻ ൌ ൜
ܵሺߛଵෝ , ߛଶሻ  ݂݅  ߛଵෝ ൏ ߛଶ 
ܵሺߛଶ, ߛଵෝ ሻ  ݂݅  ߛଶ ൏ ߛଵෝ
  (18) 
While ߛଶ
௥෢ is asymptotically efficient, ߛଵෝ  is not since it has been estimated minimising a sum of 
squared error calculated in presence of a neglected regime. In turn, ߛଵෝ  can be improved by 
refining its estimate, holding the second threshold’s estimate ߛଶ
௥෢ constant, to be: 
 ߛଵ
௥෢ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉݅݊ ଵܵ
௥ሺߛଵሻ  (19) 
where 
 ଵܵ
௥ሺߛଵሻ ൌ ቊ
ܵ൫ߛଵ, ߛଶ
௥෢൯  ݂݅  ߛଵ ൏ ߛଶ
௥෢ 
ܵ൫ߛଶ
௥෢, ߛଵ൯  ݂݅ ߛଶ
௥෢ ൏ ߛଵ
  (20) 
                                                        
13 While this appears to be one of the model’s stringent assumptions, the empirical literature applying 
threshold regression models seems to have largely overlooked the issue of regime-dependent 
heteroschedasticity. Notable exceptions are the empirical application in Hansen (1997) and the promising 
theoretical model accounting for both regime-dependent heteroschedasticity and endogeneity of the 
threshold variable in Kourtellos et al (2013). At the moment we have been unable to comply with the 
recommendation in Hansen (2000), but future extensions will tackle both the existence of regime-
dependent heteroschedasticity and endogeneity of the threshold variable. 
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To test the significance, hence the existence, of two thresholds – against the null hypothesis 
of only one – a test similar to the one in (13) can be carried out (Hansen, 1999). Being ܵଶ
௥൫ߛଶ
௥෢൯ 
the minimising sum of squared error from the estimation of the second threshold and 
ߪොଶ ൌ ଵ
௡ሺ்ିଵሻ
ܵଶ
௥൫ߛଶ
௥෢൯ its estimated variance, the test statistic ܮܴଷ ൌ
 ௌభሺఊభෞሻିௌమ
ೝ൫ఊమ
ೝ෢൯
ఙෝమ
 rejects the 
hypothesis of one threshold, in favour of two, if ܮܴଷ is large such that its bootstrapped p-
value achieves statistical significance. Hansen (1999) notes that the null sampling 
distribution of ܮܴଷ depends on several nuisance parameters that are likely to reduce the 
precision of the statistic’s bootstrapped p-values (compared to those obtained with the same 
method for ܮܴଵ), somewhat limiting the confidence in our findings. 
Since the refinement estimators in (17)-(20) have the same asymptotic distribution as the 
threshold estimate in a single threshold model in (15) and (16), the procedure described for 
ܮܴଶ can be applied. Therefore, the ሺ1 െ ߙሻ% confidence intervals for ߛଵ and ߛଶ include the 
values of ߛ such that ܮܴଶ
௥ ൑ ܿሺߙሻ and ܮܴଷ
௥ ൑ ܿሺߙሻ where  
 ܮܴଶ
௥ሺߛሻ ൌ
ௌభ
ೝሺఊሻିௌభ
ೝ൫ఊభ
ೝ෢൯
ఙෝమ
 and ܮܴଷ
௥ሺߛሻ ൌ
ௌమ
ೝሺఊሻିௌమ
ೝ൫ఊమ
ೝ෢൯
ఙෝమ
 
5. Results 
5.1 Models’ estimates 
In what follows we present the empirical findings of estimating a two-threshold model, for 
the countries and type of investment of interest, aiming to distinguish the Dis, ZInv and Inv 
behaviours. Table 6 provides a synoptic representation of the results, to elicit cross-country 
comparisons by nature of investment and CAP support. 
Table 6. Synoptic table of the models' results 
  
N° 
Regimes 
K-1 
NS/S 
Equilibrium 
expoutpi coupsub decsub varoutpi 
FR 
FB 2 - (***) NS/S + (¥/**) - § - (***) 
ME 3 - (***) S + (***) + § + 
FB 2 - (***) NS - (***) § + (*) + 
ME 3 - (***) S/NS - (¥/*/¥) § - - 
DE 
FB 3 - (***) S/NS + (***) + (***) § - 
ME 3 - (***) S/NS - + (***) § - (**) 
FB 3 - (**/***/¥) NS + (*/¥/¥) § + (***) - (***) 
ME 3 - (***) S/NS + (¥/*/¥) § + (**) + (*) 
HU 
FB 3 - (***) S/NS - + + (***) § 
ME 3 - (¥/***/***) NS - (***/**/***) + + § 
IT 
FB 2 - (***) NS - - (***) § - 
ME 2 - (¥/***) NS - + § - 
FB 3 - (¥/**/**) NS - (¥/***/***) § + - 
ME 0 - (***) NS - (*) § - - (**) 
UK 
FB 2 - (***) S - + (**) § - 
ME 0 - (***) S + + § + 
FB 2 - (***) NS/S + § + - 
ME 0 - (***) S + § + (*) + 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level based on two tailed 
tests; ¥ denotes Not Significant in estimation; § denotes Not Applicable in estimation; regime dependent 
coefficients (K-1 and expoutpi) are presented with the sign which occurs more often while significance 
(their superscript) is presented multiple times if it differs across regimes (Dis, ZInv, Inv). 
Source: authors’ elaboration on models’ estimates. 
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The evidence in Table 6 suggests that investment demand is clearly characterised by a three-
regime behaviour only in DE and HU, irrespective of the actual type of investment and 
agricultural support under which it occurs. In FR and in the UK, the number of regimes 
appears to be investment specific with the one in FB being subject to two different 
behaviours, while the one in ME features all three of them in the former country but none in 
the latter. Investment behaviour in IT seems to emerge as differentiated in two regimes only 
when farms benefit from coupled CAP support. Here, the introduction of DPs develops an 
additional distinctive behaviour for the investment in farm buildings (FB) while it seems to 
equalise differences when farms decide their investment in ME. To shed light on the nature 
of the investment behaviour when only one threshold is significant, we shall refer to Tables 7 
and 8 which report the models’ estimates for every country of interest and for both asset 
classes. In particular, associating the Dis regime with threshold values smaller or equal to ߛଵ, 
the ZInv with values in the (ߛଵ; ߛଶ) range and the Inv one with values greater or equal to ߛଶ, 
the variability in the thresholds’ significance highlights which regime can be separated from 
the others. 
Therefore, since only the larger threshold is significant in FR for the investment in FB over 
the period 2001-2004, we posit that it is not possible to distinguish the Dis from the Zinv 
regimes while a marked separation exists with the Inv one. In the UK, for that period, the Dis 
regime is distinguishable from a combined ZInv and Inv behaviour for FB while in IT the 
same holds for both asset types. While the 2005-2008 period appears to be mainly 
characterised by three distinctive behaviours, investment in FB in both FR and the UK is 
separated only into two. In particular, in the former, the Inv behaviour is significantly 
different from the Dis-ZInv combined while in the latter the regime setting itself apart from 
the other indistinguishable ones is the Dis one.14 
The coefficient for K-1 is expected to range in the [-1; 1] interval determining the rate of 
adjustment of current capital stock to its long-run equilibrium. In turn, negative values would 
suggest farms disinvest to reach a lower long-run stock of capital (Sckokai and Moro, 2009) 
while positive ones should suggest farms are under-capitalised and are required to invest in 
capital assets to reach their long-run equilibrium. Column 2 of Table 6 provides the, 
somewhat surprising, and statistically precise testimony that the farms analysed in this study 
are over-capitalised both in FB and ME as well as over time and across all the possible 
regimes. Nonetheless, this finding seems to be confirmed by other recent studies employing 
different methodologies (Petrick and Kloss, 2012; Sckokai and Moro, 2009). Column 3 of 
Table 6 analyses, similarly to Abel and Eberly (1994) and Serra et al. (2009), the dynamic 
features of the concerned investment models highlighting whether the estimates suggest a 
path towards a non-stationary (NS) or stationary (S) long-run equilibrium. This is 
determined according to whether the coefficients for the regime-dependent long-run 
adjustment variable (K-1) are closer to 0 or 1 in absolute value, respectively.15 The most stable 
and concurring evidence suggests that investment in IT is on the path to NS long-run 
equilibria, both across asset and support types. Establishing a clear path towards either a NS 
or a S equilibrium is more difficult in FR, DE and HU, while the investment behaviours in the 
UK appear mostly geared towards an S long-run equilibrium. 
The model allows for short-run adjustments in the stock of capital following fluctuations in 
expoutpi. Contrary to the consistency in both the sign and significance displayed by K-1, the 
one for short-run changes in investment quantity varies significantly, both in sign and 
significance. The dependence of investment from expoutpi is largely statistically insignificant, 
it seems to be surprisingly negative in presence of decoupled support in FR and HU while it 
                                                        
14 Tables 9 and 10 further clarify the nature of the separated regimes and the number of farms which, every 
year, belong to each of them. 
15 Note that coefficients close to (and larger than) 0.5, in absolute value, pose for a S equilibrium while a 
smaller (or very small ones) for a NS equilibrium. Moreover, in the case of mixed evidence across the 
regimes, an uncertain judgment is provided. 
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also achieves statistical significance – across the types of support – in IT. DE and the UK are 
the countries featuring a largely positive short-run relationship between investment and 
expoutpi, although seldom significant in the former. 
While K-1 and expoutpi express a behavioural and a market-based reaction of farm 
investment, respectively, the remaining columns in Table 6 highlight the relationship 
between investment and a few policy variables. Among them, those regarding the nature of 
CAP support are the most relevant ones since they proxy the historical and existing forms of 
agricultural support. Moreover, the dependence of investment on varoutpi is of interest given 
a change in the nature of support might have altered farmers’ perception of risk. While the 
effect of CAP subsidies on investment in both asset types is largely positive, negative 
dependence arises for investment in FB in FR and IT, with the latter effect being statistically 
significant at 1%. Decoupled subsidies have a negative, although statistically insignificant, 
effect on investment in ME in FR and IT. Agricultural support of both types has a consistently 
positive effect on investment in DE, HU, and the UK with only the one in DE being precisely 
determined in statistical terms. In turn, decsub appear to have a more significant impact on 
capital investment since its estimated coefficients achieve statistical significance – at 
conventional levels – in half of the models with a 25% increase compared to coupsub. The 
transition to a decoupled system of agricultural support does not seem to have induced any 
dramatic change in farmers’ attitudes towards capital investment. Exceptions may include 
the effect of support becoming positive and significant for FB investment in FR, HU and for 
ME investment in the UK, while significance is lost for FB in the UK. While remaining 
insignificant, the effect of CAP support turns from positive to negative for ME in FR and IT. 
In this deliverable we focus on the qualitative dependence of capital investment from CAP 
policy variables while in deliverable D7.2 we investigate more thoroughly the quantitative 
dependence calculating the elasticity of investment to the support and simulating ceteris 
paribus changes due to the implementation of the existing and debated CAP reform 
hypotheses. 
The last column in Table 6 contains the estimates of the effect of a measure of the risk of 
fluctuating output prices farmers experience in each nation, each year of interest. Roughly 
70% (11 out of 16) of the estimated models are characterised by a negative coefficient for the 
effect of risk on both types of investments and across two types of support schemes. 
Nonetheless, only in roughly a third of these cases (4 out of 11) is the effect statistically 
significant at conventional levels. In DE and IT the estimated coefficient has the theoretically 
consistent and expected negative sign, with the ones for the former country being mostly 
statistically significant. ME investment under a regime of decoupled payment in DE is the 
only type of investment to be positively and statistically significant – although at 10% – 
affected by a rise in the varoutpi. FR and the UK appear be evenly characterised by positive 
and negative relationships between risk and investment. In turn, in the UK the signs of this 
relationship appear to vary by investment type with FB displaying a negative and ME a 
positive one, respectively. 
Tables 7 and 8 (see Annexe) provide results, also for the dependence of the different types of 
farm investment on the regime-independent variables inpi, wealth and income according to 
the different types of support received. In particular, while inpi was expected to have a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the level of both FB and ME investment, since a 
higher expenditure for inputs is likely to result in more limited financial resources available 
for investment spending. This expectation is realised only for FB investment in DE under 
coupled support. In fact, the majority of the estimated models features a positive coefficient 
for the impact of inpi on investment with statistical significance – at conventional levels – 
being achieved more in the presence of decoupled, rather than coupled, subsidies. 
A similar finding emerges for the role of income, above and beyond the one related to the 
determination of the regimes, whereby the majority of the related estimated beta have 
unexpected signs – with occasionally minimal statistical significance – under coupled 
support while conventional wisdom is restored for all countries, except FR, and investment 
types over the period 2005-2008. Moreover, estimated coefficients are statistically 
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significant at the 1% level in DE and at the 5% level in IT while in the UK the one for FB 
achieves statistical significance of the 10% level, while for the ME the investment coefficient 
is insignificant at conventional levels. 
The positive impact of wealth on investment levels appears very consistent across countries 
and asset classes, especially when coupled support was in place. In fact, it is statistically 
significant – although at 10% and 5% – in FR and DE for both investment types and for FB in 
the UK. On the contrary, wealth is highly statistically significant, while positive, only when 
investment in FB in HU is investigated over the 2005-2008 period. In the other cases, it 
remains largely positive while it loses any statistical precision. 
The estimated models’ explanatory power appears somewhat modest, especially over the 
period 2005-2008, since the ܴଶ measure only seldom exceeds 0.5. In fact, a few estimated 
coefficients are close to conventional statistical significance. These findings, associated with 
the almost ubiquitous heteroschedasticity of the remainder error, suggest that there still 
might be significant variability unaccounted for. Future extensions should attempt to control 
for additional sources of heterogeneity to limit the incidence of heteroschedasticity and, 
hopefully, to improve the models’ explanatory power. 
6. Conclusions 
The peculiar characteristics of the agricultural sector across the EU MS and over time call for 
a cross-country analysis of the developmental effects of agricultural policies. Among the 
different implementations of this analysis, two main declinations can be identified: focusing 
on specific inputs (i.e., different types of policy instruments) and/or on specific outcomes 
(i.e., inter alia the farmers’ choice to specialise in selected productions, the farmers’ choice of 
the amount and type of labour employed and investment decisions). Agricultural investment 
decisions might be deemed very important since they are targeted at combating the 
obsolescence of capital assets, which are subject to significant yearly depreciation, as well as 
advancing the technological dimension of the production technique whenever there is a 
major innovation in terms of commercial capital goods. Adaptation of the capital stock to 
increasing farm size or differentiation, as well as to a more modern technological base, is 
likely to further increase the profitability of the agricultural sector to enhancing countries’ 
economic prospects. 
The present deliverable has investigated the role of first coupled and later decoupled CAP 
subsidies – in a sample of selected MS – in determining the investment demand for farm 
buildings and the machinery and equipment of specialised arable crop farms, allowing for an 
uncertainty. Moreover, the reduced-form investment equations have been specified to 
account for several of the determinants considered in the literature. Applying a theoretical 
model of investment choice featuring irregularities in the adjustment cost function and an 
econometric technique capable of identifying the existence of separating equilibria, the 
deliverable has been able to investigate whether disinvestment, zero investment and positive 
investment in both asset classes are optimal reactions to the existence of ranges – rather than 
point values – of shadow asset prices determining actual investment behaviour.  
Empirical estimates suggest that the range of zero investment is clearly and consistently 
identified, on top of the more common disinvestment and investment ones, for Germany 
across asset classes and CAP support scheme and asset classes for Hungary, since the latter 
has only been an EU member since the implementation of decoupled support. Three regimes 
also appear to characterise machinery and equipment investment in France, irrespective of 
the type of support received. The more common differentiation between disinvestment and 
positive investment pertains to farm building investment in France and the UK, across 
support types; to Italy for both asset classes under coupled support. An investment behaviour 
based on point values of the shadow price of capital is proper to the UK for machinery and 
equipment, irrespective of the type of support. This evidence might help in devising new 
regime-specific policy interventions where clear separations are detected. 
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Since empirical evidence suggests that specialised arable crop farms are disinvesting towards 
lower levels of long-run capital endowments, frequent anecdotal evidence that agriculture is 
undercapitalised is not supported by the data. Nonetheless, except for the UK and Germany, 
these trajectories should lead towards non stationary long-run equilibria implying the 
possibility of further and different future dynamics. While empirical evidence suggests that 
the trajectories towards the long-run equilibria appear highly statistically significant, short-
run adjustments in capital stocks due to changes in output prices appear largely insignificant 
and often display a counterintuitive sign. 
The association between both types of investment and both types of CAP subsidies is mostly 
positive, with the dependence on decoupled support barely more significant. The expectation 
of a negative association between the variance of the expected output price index – 
accounting for some the uncertainty farmers face in commercialising their outputs – is 
largely met, although very rarely in a statistically significant manner. 
The estimates presented in this deliverable provide the raw data to carry out a more detailed 
quantitative appraisal of existing levels of investment and support for every identified regime 
in deliverable 7.4. Moreover, deliverable 7.4 provides the comparative static analysis of the 
changes in investment levels due to the implementation of the different CAP reform scenarios 
currently being envisaged and discussed by the European Commission. 
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Table 7. Estimates for the threshold investment models during the existence of coupled support (2001-2004) 
 FR DE IT UK 
 FB ME FB ME FB ME FB ME 
Regime-indep.         
inpi 358.0707*** 
(101.8039) 
-107.8006 
(95.5483) 
-411.4871** 
(187.1292) 
904.1538*** 
(298.3131) 
4.6058 
(16.9884) 
328.0619 
(220.1820) 
424.0656* 
(255.5108) 
25.3139 
(535.6026) 
varoutpi -44.4970*** 
(10.6224) 
67.6293 
(59.6204) 
-121.6622 
(81.6572) 
-755.2638** 
(368.1210) 
-2.7284 
(22.3605) 
-222.0963 
(413.0873) 
-62.5688 
(99.1689) 
279.5438 
(334.5365) 
coupsub -4.3330 
(102.0790) 
54.4573 
(170.9632) 
595.9798*** 
(99.3995) 
541.5990*** 
(55.5250) 
-32.3735*** 
(9.0984) 
146.9623 
(96.6772) 
199.3998** 
(81.8289) 
320.4714 
(269.5284) 
wealth 31.4534* 
(16.1728) 
77.5576** 
(30.4643) 
18.2594* 
(10.0692) 
25.4877* 
(14.8948) 
0.1943 
(0.2605) 
-0.9786 
(3.0314) 
20.1043* 
(10.3869) 
-12.8530 
(19.1931) 
income -4.4661* 
(2.4538) 
-1.4252 
(3.5815) 
3.7162 
(2.8390) 
-6.3046* 
(3.4143) 
0.0086 
(0.0810) 
-0.6148 
(1.3441) 
-4.4220* 
(2.2976) 
4.2557 
(7.4252) 
K-1 § § § § § § § -0.5704*** 
(0.1804) 
expoutpi § § § § § § § 29,583.5858 
(29,265.4275) 
Regime-dep.         
K-1 Dis -0.2664*** 
(0.0949) 
-0.6193*** 
(0.0564) 
-0.4617*** 
(0.0995) 
-0.5000*** 
(0.0516) 
-0.0203*** 
(0.0047) 
-0.0499 
(0.0356) 
-0.8853*** 
(0.1369) 
§ 
K-1 ZInv § -0.4992*** 
(0.0485) 
-0.6851*** 
(0.1062) 
-0.4169*** 
(0.0526) 
§ § § § 
K-1 Inv -0.4807*** 
(0.0895) 
-0.5627*** 
(0.0640) 
-0.3411*** 
(0.0608) 
-0.2829*** 
(0.0708) 
-0.0389*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.2417*** 
(0.0813) 
-0.6920*** 
(0.1884) 
§ 
expoutpi Dis 5,632.1705 
(3,619.9064) 
15,426.8277*** 
(4,764.1437) 
47,165.3703*** 
(14,492.8949) 
-7,057.3986 
(15,815.2835) 
-847.4395 
(1,592.8180) 
-4,107.6015 
(13,161.5586) 
-14,759.9722 
(19,036.7487) 
§ 
expoutpi ZInv § 12,514.4971** 
(5,186.1710) 
56,311.1715*** 
(15,181.1422) 
-8,052.5394 
(15,525.6148) 
§ § § § 
expoutpi Inv 10,500.8845** 
(4,581.6743) 
23,283.1538*** 
(6,366.3156) 
39,995.3939*** 
(14,724.8169) 
-16,090.3710 
(15,620.4561) 
-461.1140 
(1,529.5201) 
-1,928.2455 
(13,221.8401) 
-20,680.4681 
(20,137.3392) 
§ 
Thresholds¥         
ߛଵ 6.8161 
[6.5043; 19.9178] 
2.1246*** 
[1.8557; 2.1246] 
54.5174*** 
[53.6037; 54.5174] 
6.9888** 
[4.1944; 33.2024] 
11.9697*** 
[11.9697; 32.2014] 
37.0353** 
[32.2584; 46.5037] 
14.6218*** 
[13.5337; 16.5211] 
§ 
ߛଶ 31.5807*** 
[28.1491; 31.5807] 
14.5619** 
[11.7269; 14.9436] 
106.0978*** 
[106.0978; 108.1543] 
21.8451*** 
[21.3678; 22.1395] 
334.1524 
[48.5538; 355.2406] 
134.2202 
[4.8418; 154.5264] 
29.0886 
[6.8238; 29.2584] 
§ 
Diagnostics         
ܴଶ 0.2153 0.6144 0.4138 0.3252 0.5496 0.1962 0.5707 0.2482 
Het Test  15.0235* 119.9096*** 44.5959*** 30.8945*** 6.0287 98.0160*** 35.2768*** 64.5537*** 
Notes: estimation carried out in Matlab R2011b; Eicker (1967)-Huber (1967)-White (1980) heteroschedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses when the White test for heteroschedasticity is 
statistically significant at conventional levels; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level based on two tailed tests; ¥ estimates are based on results from the 
refinement estimators (14) and (16) when two thresholds are statistically significant, 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. 
Source: authors’ estimation on EU-FADN - DG AGRI data employing a modified version of the Matlab code provided by Hansen on his website. 
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Table 8. Estimates for the threshold investment models during the existence of decoupled support (2005-2008) 
 FR DE HU IT UK 
 FB ME FB ME FB ME FB ME FB ME 
Regime-indep.           
inpi 307.3357*** 
(53.0005) 
172.5433 
(132.2762) 
414.2898*** 
(135.7757) 
-210.1775 
(148.9530) 
-0.3557 
(104.2873) 
1,281.0744*** 
(258.3974) 
689.5875** 
(281.5016) 
286.1506** 
(145.4518) 
-114.8194 
(172.5395) 
-133.1749 
(224.7502) 
varoutpi 40.8033 
(27.0404) 
-86.2871 
(81.2080) 
-189.6246*** 
(57.4738) 
269.1842* 
(161.9029) 
§ § -21.4179 
(17.9789) 
-26.0962** 
(11.1152) 
-88.1014 
(335.7510) 
190.6704 
(337.0412) 
coupsub § § § § 341.4439 
(280.0737) 
374.3918 
(231.5646) 
§ § § § 
decsub 51.2279* 
(27.2202) 
-121.6025 
(76.4121) 
435.5835*** 
(104.9752) 
622.7084** 
(305.5804) 
673.5537*** 
(188.1409) 
274.1298 
(329.9545) 
21.8279 
(21.3745) 
-12.7120 
(8.9094) 
49.1979 
(179.9548) 
687.1385* 
(404.1334) 
wealth -6.9621 
(11.3222) 
8.6418 
(37.2889) 
-1.5339 
(14.6257) 
-11.7505 
(12.2459) 
96.9014*** 
(31.0677) 
-9.6685 
(13.7904) 
0.3856 
(0.3670) 
0.6714 
(0.4877) 
9.2861 
(7.3405) 
2.4298 
(10.7986) 
income -0.9156 
(1.6169) 
-1.8921 
(1.5755) 
26.3529*** 
(8.6986) 
6.0514*** 
(2.3207) 
0.5739 
(1.5497) 
4.9588 
(3.8006) 
11.2992** 
(5.1967) 
0.5173** 
(0.2423) 
13.9523* 
(8.1833) 
8.6444 
(5.8430) 
K-1 § § § § § § § -0.0563*** 
(0.0123) 
§ -0.6290*** 
(0.1122) 
expoutpi § § § § § § § -4,400.7930* 
(2,627.8104) 
§ 14,065.1954 
(16,394.0412) 
Regime-dep.           
K-1 Dis -0.3591*** 
(0.0301) 
-0.5355*** 
(0.0703) 
-0.2410** 
(0.1011) 
-0.5803*** 
(0.0654) 
-0.5748*** 
(0.0708) 
-0.1080 
(0.0828) 
0.0066 
(0.0432) 
§ -0.2431*** 
(0.0896) 
§ 
K-1 ZInv § -0.3883*** 
(0.0673) 
-0.2904*** 
(0.0894) 
-0.5210*** 
(0.0601) 
-0.4583*** 
(0.0710) 
-0.4068*** 
(0.0722) 
-0.0711** 
(0.0281) 
§ § § 
K-1 Inv -0.2635*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.2838*** 
(0.0714) 
-0.0772 
(0.1494) 
-0.3012*** 
(0.0473) 
-0.3611*** 
(0.0517) 
-0.3120*** 
(0.0752) 
-0.0837** 
(0.0327) 
§ -0.4253*** 
(0.0635) 
§ 
expoutpi Dis -12,650.4607*** 
(3,019.5694) 
-4,204.5030 
(5,172.6417) 
26,506.6541* 
(15,488.2088) 
7,248.6988 
(7,318.9936) 
-2,696.3963 
(4,765.7337) 
-21,558.2012*** 
(5,234.0849) 
-7,093.6948 
(4,322.3438) 
§ 17,293.6708 
(23,180.7877) 
§ 
expoutpi ZInv § -7,707.3729* 
(4,671.5545) 
8,170.6373 
(8,252.5656) 
12,272.5012* 
(6,588.7262) 
-4,748.8684 
(4,611.7548) 
-12,116.5536** 
(5,159.6178) 
-11,486.0585*** 
(3,820.5349) 
§ § § 
expoutpi Inv -11,980.0311*** 
(3,182.4731) 
-6,196.4155 
(4,680.5041) 
-10,675.5064 
(7,455.8190) 
-1,653.1539 
(6,895.1521) 
-6,052.2831 
(4,430.6624) 
-15,420.1869*** 
(5,047.0552) 
-22,855.8909*** 
(6,412.0364) 
§ 7,624.1822 
(20,939.3009) 
§ 
Thresholds¥           
ߛଵ 10.2249 
[0.7690; 29.8313] 
4.3943*** 
[3.5701; 4.6632] 
16.3660** 
[13.9281; 21.9305] 
14.7580** 
[10.0888; 
19.5993] 
6.1187*** 
[1.6986; 6.2218] 
1.8091*** 
[1.7795; 1.8091] 
40.2202** 
[39.2797; 40.2202] 
§ 3.6914* 
[2.7451; 19.0181] 
§ 
ߛଶ 47.0530** 
[45.6733; 
47.6036] 
16.3243** 
[7.8313; 
17.0944] 
112.2358* 
[105.0486; 
112.7820] 
43.5636*** 
[43.5636; 
43.6545] 
34.4125*** 
[31.2791; 
34.7213] 
10.5331** 
[5.5490; 16.7051] 
114.8387** 
[73.1232; 118.6542] 
§ 18.4681 
[14.8694; 
33.9366] 
§ 
Diagnostics           
ܴଶ 0.3136 0.2543 0.0896 0.2743 0.8190 0.3153 0.1639 0.0634 0.2286 0.3336 
Het Test 11.3892 170.4870*** 42.3277*** 149.6563*** 305.4955*** 61.5894*** 242.5125*** 399.5303*** 3.4143 76.9485*** 
Notes: estimation carried out in Matlab R2011b; Eicker (1967)-Huber (1967)-White (1980) heteroschedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses in case the White test for heteroschedasticity is 
statistically significant at conventional levels; *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level based on two tailed tests; ¥ estimates are based on results from the 
refinement estimators (14) and (16) when two thresholds are statistically significant, 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. 
Source: authors’ estimation on EU-FADN - DG AGRI data employing a modified version of the Matlab code provided by Hansen on his website. 
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